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This paper emphasizes the role of wage growth in shaping work incentives. It provides an analytical
framework for labor supply in the presence of a return to labor market experience and aggregate productivity
growth. A key finding of the theory is that there is an interaction between these two forms of wage
growth that explains why aggregate productivity growth can affect employment rates in steady state.
The model thus speaks to an enduring puzzle in macroeconomics by uncovering a channel from the
declines in trend aggregate wage growth that accompanied the productivity slowdown of the 1970s
to persistent declines in employment.
The paper also shows that the return to experience for high school dropouts has fallen substantially
since the 1970s, which further contributes to the secular decline in employment rates. Taken together,
the mechanisms identified in the paper can account for all of the increase in nonemployment among
white male high school dropouts from 1968 to 2006. For all white males, it accounts for approximately
one half of the increase in the aggregate nonemployment rate over the same period.
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Rates of joblessness in the U.S. have varied substantially over time. As a secular phenom-
enon, the aggregate rate of nonemployment among prime age white males has doubled since
the late 1960s (see Figure 1A). These trends are driven by dramatic declines in labor market
attachment among the low￿ skilled. For high school dropouts, trend nonemployment surged
from 7 percent in the late 1960s up to 25 percent in recent years (Figure 1B).
Explaining the variation in U.S. joblessness over time has been a central question for
labor and macroeconomics and for public policy for several decades. Among the ￿rst to
document the dramatic secular rise in rates of nonemployment, and its concentration among
the low￿ skilled were two in￿ uential papers by Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002). They
suggest that an important driving force to these trends was the decline in the demand for
low￿ skilled workers that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.
This paper identi￿es a novel and complementary explanation for these trends. We
emphasize the role of wage growth in shaping work incentives. The results of our analysis
reveal that variation in wage growth can help explain increased rates of joblessness among
low￿ skilled males in the U.S. through two channels: First, through reductions in the returns
to labor market experience among high school dropouts over time; and second, through
reductions in economy￿ wide wage growth that accompanied the productivity slowdown of
the 1970s. Together, we show that these trends in wage growth can account for all of the
secular rise in low￿ skilled joblessness between the late 1960s and recent years, and for one
half of the increase in aggregate joblessness among white males.
We arrive at these conclusions by formulating a model of equilibrium employment that
incorporates wage growth through returns to labor market experience as well as aggregate
productivity growth. The model reveals that the joint processes of the accumulation of
labor market experience and the decision to supply labor are naturally intertwined: In
order to accumulate experience, an individual must work. The interaction between these
1two processes in the model generates a strong theoretical rationale for a connection between
rates of wage growth and the level of equilibrium employment. We show that changes in
the experience￿ earnings pro￿le that workers face a⁄ect the decision of a marginal worker to
seek lifetime employment. Intuitively, if the ￿wage escalator￿￿ attens due to a decline in
the return to experience, the payo⁄ to being engaged in the workforce over a lifetime falls,
and a marginal worker will ￿nd employment a less attractive prospect.
The connection between wage growth and work incentives in our model speaks to an
enduring puzzle in the macroeconomics of labor markets. In particular, our model uncovers
a channel from reductions in aggregate wage growth to long run reductions in the level
of aggregate employment. Economists have long been tempted to relate the decline in
economy￿ wide wage growth associated with the productivity slowdown of the 1970s to the
persistent deterioration in equilibrium employment beginning in the early to mid-1970s.
A prominent early example is Bruno and Sachs (1985). More recently, Staiger, Stock, and
Watson (2001, Figure 1.9) have emphasized the striking negative secular correlation between
productivity growth and unemployment. In particular, Stock has posted this ￿intriguing
graph￿on his webpage for the last number of years as an implicit challenge to the economics
profession to explain it.1
Super￿cially, the case for a link between productivity growth and employment rates
appears simple: Should it be surprising that employment declines when the returns to work
have fallen? The theoretical link between productivity growth and equilibrium employment,
however, has proved elusive. Blanchard (2007) surveys modern models of the aggregate labor
market and concludes that they ￿deliver, to a ￿rst order, long run neutrality of unemployment
to productivity growth.￿ While existing theories may have di⁄erent implications for the short
and medium run e⁄ects of productivity growth, he concludes that our understanding of the
link between productivity and employment is weak: ￿The truth is we do not know. And this
1See http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~JStock/. We focus on nonemployment rather than unemployment
because of the signi￿cant secular increase in nonparticipation observed among men since the 1970s.
2is a serious hole in knowledge￿(Blanchard, 2007, p.416).
As our theory makes clear, traditional models of employment determination have the
implication that permanent changes in productivity growth leave equilibrium employment
rates unchanged: In any model with a steady state, changes in productivity growth should
equally a⁄ect the returns to work and the returns to not working, as any violation of this
relation will cause an economy to converge either to full employment or zero employment in
the long run.
Our model bridges this gap in the literature. It shows that aggregate wage growth
interacts with the returns to experience in determining equilibrium employment. Over a
working life, aggregate wage growth acts like compound interest on a positive return to
experience. In this way, a positive return to experience levers the e⁄ect of productivity
growth on the lifetime payo⁄ from working. Consequently, this provides a mechanism
through which changes in aggregate wage growth can a⁄ect equilibrium employment.
A ￿nal contribution of our analysis is to highlight an important life￿ cycle dimension to
these e⁄ects. Using our model we show that the labor supply of older workers is predicted to
be less responsive to shocks relative to younger workers. This outcome arises from a natural
interaction between ￿nite working lifetimes and the presence of a return to experience. Older
workers become less marginal to shocks both because they have accumulated substantial
work experience, and because they have a shorter remaining working life over which shocks
to wage growth can a⁄ect their earning potential. Consequently, our model predicts that
the rise in joblessness among the low￿ skilled initially should be concentrated among younger
workers, who are more marginal to the employment decision. Consistent with this, rates of
nonemployment among high school dropouts below the age of 40 rose faster than for their
older counterparts in the data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we present a very simple model
of labor supply in the presence of a return to experience and aggregate wage growth in
3order to provide the basic qualitative intuition for the e⁄ects we emphasize. In Section
III, we then present empirical results that con￿rm the substantial changes in the return to
experience and aggregate wage growth among low￿ skilled, marginal workers. Using data
from the decennial Censuses and the American Community Survey, we provide evidence
on the experience￿ earnings pro￿le for di⁄erent skill groups over time in the U.S. This
exercise reveals a little￿ known empirical trend: The experience￿ earnings pro￿le among high
school dropouts ￿ attened between 1970 and 2000. Moreover, the magnitude of these e⁄ects
is substantial. The capitalized value of earnings over the ￿rst thirty years of working
life declined by nearly 50 percent since 1970 for high school dropouts. In Section IV,
we extend the simple model of Section II to account for ￿nite worker lifetimes, as well as
nonlinear experience￿ earnings pro￿les. Using this generalized model, we then draw out the
quantitative implications of the observed changes in wage growth documented in Section III.
In Section V we discuss how this paper relates to the literature. In Section VI, we o⁄er
conclusions.
II Basic Model
Before we delve into a more elaborate model of the decision to supply labor in the presence
of returns to experience, in this section we ￿rst present a simple model that delivers our
basic insights on the interaction of aggregate wage growth and the return to labor market
experience and its role in the determination of incentives to work.
Consider a simple environment in which there are two employment states, employment
and nonemployment, and workers choose whether they want to supply their labor or not.
The critical addition that we explore relative to previous literature is to allow for two forms
of wage growth￿ growth in starting wages, and returns to labor market experience￿ as well
as growth in the ￿ ow payo⁄from nonemployment. Note that the phenomenon we are aiming
to model is the life-long choice that a worker makes to be committed to the labor market
4and therefore accrue the returns to experience. Consequently, we abstract from frictional
episodes of unemployment between jobs. Adding frictional unemployment would complicate
the model, but not alter its central messages.
Consider an in￿nitely lived worker i who must make a once-and-for-all decision at the
start of his (non￿ ) working life between working forever and not working forever. If he works,
he accumulates a year of labor market experience x for every year he works, and faces a wage
pro￿le wi (x;t). Assume that there is a return to experience gx, and aggregate wage growth
gw, such that
lnwi (x;t) = lnwi (0;0) + gxx + gwt: (1)
It is straightforward to derive this as the labor demand equation implied by a constant returns
to scale production technology with fully ￿ exible inputs, in which a worker with experience x
accounts for egxx e¢ ciency units of labor, and labor augmenting technical progress occurs at
rate gw over time (see the Appendix for a derivation). If the individual decides not to work,
he does not accumulate experience, and he receives a payo⁄ from nonemployment equal to
bi (t). Assume that the latter grows over time at rate gb.2
In this simple environment, all the worker need do is choose the option that delivers the
highest present value of lifetime earnings. In particular, if the discount rate is equal to r, it
is straightforward to show that a newborn potential worker at time t will decide to work if
his o⁄ered wage, wi (0;t) exceeds a reservation wage equal to
wi (0;t) ￿ wRi (t) = ￿bi (t), where ￿ ￿
r ￿ gw ￿ gx
r ￿ gb
: (2)
2In this context, the ￿ ow payo⁄ from nonemployment b must include much more that unemployment
compensation, which has short duration in the U.S. Empirically, much of the secular rise in nonemployment
in the U.S. is accounted for by increases in very persistent (full-year) nonemployment spells (Juhn, Murphy
and Topel, 1991, 2002). In addition, the model we present is one of the life-long decision to work. It
is surprising to us how little work has been done to document the sources of income that persistently
nonemployed individuals face in the U.S. Possible interpretations of b include the income of other household
members, income from employment in turbulent jobs with limited human capital accumulation, the value of
home production and leisure, as well as public health insurance, disability insurance and social security.
5This simple formulation for the reservation wage relies on an in￿nite horizon speci￿cation
and an assumption of geometric growth in this simple model. In Section IV below, we present
a more general model that preserves the intuition of this formulation for the reservation wage
while taking into account a more realistic speci￿cation of the trajectory of wages.
A Wage Growth and Steady￿ State Employment
A number of insights follow from the simple observation in equation (2). First note that, while
the reservation wage grows over time at the same rate as the payo⁄from nonemployment, gb,
the wage of a newborn worker, w(0;t), grows at the rate of aggregate wage growth, gw. To
see the signi￿cance of this, imagine an economy populated by workers facing di⁄erent wage
pro￿les, wi (x;t) = !iw(x;t), and di⁄erent payo⁄s from nonemployment, bi (t) = ￿ib(t), but
who otherwise face the same labor supply problem. The variables !i and ￿i thus represent
heterogeneity in skill and the payo⁄ from nonemployment respectively. It follows that the
steady￿ state employment rate in this economy will be given by
L
￿ = Pr[wi (0;t) ￿ ￿bi (t)] = 1 ￿ ￿(￿￿); (3)
where ￿(￿) is the c.d.f. of the ratio !i=￿i, and ￿ ￿ b(t)=w(0;t) is the replacement rate for
newborn workers.
For employment to be in steady state, the replacement rate ￿ must be stationary. The
replacement rate will be stationary only if the growth rate of the payo⁄from nonemployment
must equal to the rate of aggregate wage growth, gb = gw in steady state. To see why,
imagine for example that gb > gw. In this case, the employment rate will converge to zero
over time as the payo⁄ from nonemployment increasingly dominates the payo⁄ from work.
A symmetric logic holds for the case where gb < gw. Imposing the restriction required for a
6steady state to exist, gb = gw, implies that the reservation wage may be rewritten as




Note that the constraint gw = gb is not special to our formulation. Any model with a steady
state will have to impose it.
Together, equations (3) and (4) characterize the determinants of incentives to work in
this simple environment. We observe that changes in employment are driven by changes
in either ￿ or ￿. The e⁄ects of changes in the replacement rate ￿ are simple and well￿
understood: A higher replacement rate renders nonemployment more attractive and reduces
steady state labor supply. The latter e⁄ect is a very conventional long run property of models
of equilibrium employment (see Blanchard, 2000; Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, among
others). The determinants of the variable ￿ are less common in the literature￿ the return
to labor market experience, gx, and the rate of aggregate wage growth, gw. We now explore
these e⁄ects in more detail.
Consider ￿rst the e⁄ects of the return to experience. Note from equation (4) that a
positive return to experience, gx > 0, drives a worker￿ s reservation wage below his ￿ ow
payo⁄ from nonemployment. The reason is simple: If workers anticipate positive returns to
experience, they will forgo earnings in the short run in order to reap the returns to experience
in the long run. This e⁄ect is neglected in macroeconomic models where wage growth is
linked only to the level of productivity and not to labor market experience.
A corollary of this observation is that increases in the return to experience will reduce
reservation wages even further below the ￿ ow payo⁄from nonemployment, and therefore will
lead to increased employment rates. The reason is that increases in the return to experience
raise the present discounted value of earnings from working relative to not working. More-
over, such changes in the return to experience are likely to have high-powered e⁄ects on work
incentives. Intuitively, this is for the familiar reason that changes in the rate of growth of
7an income stream have large e⁄ects on the present discounted value of that stream, which is
what matters for employment incentives in the model, due to compounding. Mechanically,
this can be veri￿ed by noting that the denominator, r ￿ gw, in equation (4) is likely to be
small for reasonable values of the interest rate, r, and aggregate wage growth, gw.
Now consider the e⁄ects of a change in the rate of aggregate wage growth, gw. Equation
(4) suggests that, when the return to experience is positive, increases in the rate of aggregate
wage growth will lead to a reduction in reservation wages, and thereby an increase in aggre-
gate employment. The simple reason is that greater aggregate wage growth interacts with
the return to experience by compounding the rate of wage growth relative to the growth of
the payo⁄ from nonemployment. Aggregate wage growth acts like compound interest on
the return to experience.3 It is important to note that the latter e⁄ect of aggregate wage
growth on incentives to supply labor is absent in traditional models of aggregate employment
determination which abstract from returns to experience and implicitly set gx = 0. It is this
feature of standard models of equilibrium employment that Blanchard (2007) emphasizes as
a hole in our understanding of aggregate labor markets.
The perceptive reader will observe that the e⁄ect of aggregate wage growth in our model
is driven by the speci￿cation that experience is multiplicative, not additive, in determining
wages, i.e. that the Mincerian wage equation be speci￿ed in logarithms rather than in
levels. The speci￿cation that experience and productivity are multiplicative is, however,
much deeper than a functional form restriction. If the returns to experience were additive
in wages, i.e., a ￿xed amount rather than ￿xed percentage, then the returns to experience
would become vanishingly small over time if there is a positive trend to productivity. So an
additive speci￿cation for experience is asymptotically equivalent to assuming no return to
3The mechanism for the e⁄ect of gw on employment incentives, though simple, can appear subtle. A
natural question is whether this mechanism requires any more than the usual ingenuity that we ask of
individuals when we apply our economic models to the real world. Our sense is that it does not. Individuals
in the model do not care about the composition of wage growth between aggregate wage growth, and returns
to experience; they only have to keep track of overall growth in wages. The mechanism can appear subtle
to economists because we care about delineating the separate e⁄ects of gw and gx.
8experience at all.
B Where Shocks Hit Hardest: The Importance of Marginal Work-
ers
The simple model of this section adds two novel determinants of variation in the aggregate
employment rate: the return to experience and the rate of aggregate wage growth. A more
precise expression for the e⁄ects of changes in gw and gx on steady state employment can be
obtained from simple log di⁄erentiation of (4) to obtain,
￿lnL
￿ = " ￿ ￿ln￿; (5)





It is important to note that " is the elasticity of labor supply on the extensive margin, i.e.
the employment vs. nonemployment margin. Consequently, it measures the elasticity of the
inverse c.d.f. of reservation wages in the economy.
Thus, we see that the employment e⁄ects of changes in the rates of aggregate wage growth
and the return to experience are increasing in the size of the wage￿ elasticity of aggregate
labor supply, ". The intuition for this result is simple. A small value of " implies that
there are little incentive e⁄ects of wages on workers￿choice to supply labor. This in turn
extinguishes the labor supply e⁄ects of wage growth which rely on the notion that wages
incentivize labor supply.
It is natural to ask what factors might determine the size of the employment elasticity.
We now show that " will be particularly large for workers who are low-skilled. To see this,
note that we can write the steady￿ state employment rate among workers of a given skill !
9as
L
￿ (!) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿￿=!); (7)
where ￿(￿) is the c.d.f. of the inverse of workers￿idiosyncratic payo⁄s from not working,








It is straightforward to verify that a su¢ cient condition for this elasticity to decline with
skill, !, is that the modal worker of that skill is employed.4 Thus, the model predicts that
low-skilled workers respond to changes in the rate of aggregate productivity growth and the
return to experience to a greater extent. The simple reason is that low-skilled workers are
more likely to be on the margin of the employment decision than high-skilled workers, and
therefore are more responsive to changes in the incentives to work.
This prediction of the model formalizes the intuition underlying the empirical analysis of
Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991, 2002). They show that much of the increase in joblessness
in the U.S. from the 1970s onward is concentrated among low-skilled workers, an observation
that is replicated in Figure 1B. In addition, they provide estimates of the elasticity of labor
supply by skill group (see Table 9 of their 1991 article and Table 10 of their 2002 article) that
con￿rm that low-skilled labor supply is much more elastic than for higher skilled workers.
Both of these results are consistent with the formal implications of our model. We will see
later in Section IV that the tight correspondence between our theoretical model and the
empirical results of Juhn, Murphy, and Topel will enable to us to interpret and quantify the
implications of our model for observed trends in joblessness in the U.S. over time.
4To see this, note that since ￿￿=! is declining in !, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply for workers
with skill ! will decline with skill if ￿00 (￿￿=!) > 0. If ￿(￿) is unimodal, a su¢ cient condition for the latter
is that the modal worker with skill ! chooses to work.
10C Summary of Qualitative Predictions
This section has used a very simple model to elucidate the e⁄ects of wage growth on aggregate
employment in an environment that incorporates a return to labor market experience. It
has established the following qualitative predictions:
￿ Increases in the rate of return to experience reduce reservation wages and stimulate
aggregate employment by increasing the present discounted value of working over not
working.
￿ If there is a positive return to experience, increases in the rate of aggregate wage growth
will also reduce reservation wages and raise aggregate employment.
￿ The employment e⁄ects of wage growth, of the return to experience, and of the inter-
action of wage growth and the return to experience will be greatest among low￿ skilled
workers who are the most marginal to the employment decision.
III Evidence
The preceding section has provided a rationale for why changes in experience￿ earnings pro-
￿les and aggregate wage growth that workers face can have implications for changes in
aggregate employment. In the light of this, in this section we take on the task of docu-
menting evidence on changes in the returns to experience and in aggregate wage growth by
skill for workers in the U.S. over time. In Section IV, we use this evidence, together with
a generalization of the model of Section II, to simulate the e⁄ects on employment rates of
changes in the return to experience and its interaction with real wage growth.
11A Changes in the Experience￿ Earnings Pro￿le by Skill
To measure changes in the experience￿ earnings pro￿le over time, we employ data taken from
the decennial Censuses from 1960 to 2000, and the American Community Surveys from 2001
to 2007 for the U.S.5 Earnings are measured by the annual wage, salary and business income
of respondents. As our theory makes clear, we are especially interested in changes in returns
to experience for marginal workers who are relatively low in the skill distribution. We use
educational attainment as a proxy measure of skill. We distinguish among high school
dropouts (9 to 11 years of education), high school graduates (12 years), those with some
college education (13 to 15 years) and those with a college or higher degree (16+ years).
Experience is measured by potential experience, i.e. age minus years of education minus
six.
We additionally restrict our samples along several dimensions. First, we concentrate
on outcomes for white men since labor force participation issues for non-whites and women
are signi￿cantly more complicated (Smith and Welch, 1989; Welch, 1990; Blau, 1998).6 In
particular, we restrict the samples to non￿ immigrant white males aged 16 to 64. Second, we
focus on the return to experience among full-time, full-year workers, de￿ned as those who
work 35 hours or more per week, and who are employed for 50 or more weeks per year. We
do this for a number of reasons. By focusing on such workers, we can be more con￿dent
that respondents have left full-time education when we observe their earnings. Moreover,
the observed pro￿les are more likely to re￿ ect variation in wages rather than hours or weeks
worked. Finally, as will become clear in what follows, the fact that we are able to measure
only potential experience raises a concern that a changing relationship between potential
and actual experience could confound observed changes in experience￿ earnings pro￿les. By
5Our Census samples are taken from the public use 1% sample for 1960, 2% sample for 1970, and 5%
samples for 1980 to 2000 available from IPUMS. They parallel those used by Heckman, Lochner, and Todd
(2007) in their important study of the returns to schooling. We are grateful to those authors for providing
us with detailed tabulations from their work that we used in the preliminary version of this paper.
6These are worthy topics that warrant careful and separate analyses. For an analysis of the employment
e⁄ects of changes in returns to experience among women, see Olivetti (2006).
12concentrating on full-time, full-year workers, such a confound is minimized.
Figure 2 plots average log earnings as a function of potential experience by education
group, normalized to the mean log earnings of workers entering the labor market. Log
earnings are normalized to equal zero at zero experience to abstract from the signi￿cant
di⁄erences in levels of earnings across education groups and of aggregate wages across time.
Within each panel, the lines correspond to the experience￿ earnings pro￿les for di⁄erent
Census years for a given education group.7 Figure 2A displays the experience￿ earnings
pro￿le for high school dropouts (9-11 years of education) over time. Note that outcomes for
these lower-skilled workers are of particular interest for our purposes because they are more
likely to be marginal to the employment decision. Figure 2A tells a striking story: The
experience￿ earnings pro￿le among high school dropouts ￿ attened dramatically after 1970.
At ￿ve to ten years of potential experience, earnings are around 50 log points lower in the
later period compared to the earlier period. In addition, the gap in the experience￿ earnings
pro￿le persists at higher levels of experience.
Figure 2B plots the experience pro￿le for high school graduates. This reveals a mild
drop in mid-career earnings between 1970 and 1990, with a more substantial drop in the
experience￿ earnings pro￿le between 1990 and 2000. In comparison to the outcomes for high
school dropouts, the changes are relatively modest.
As emphasized above, workers with schooling beyond high school are unlikely to be at
the point in the skill distribution where employment is a marginal decision, so that patterns
in experience￿ pro￿les among these groups are less relevant to employment rates. By way of
comparison, however, we include results in Figures 2C and 2D for workers with some college
education and a college degree or higher respectively. For these higher skilled workers, an
7Prior to 1980, Census data record only hours last week, and after 1990 only usual hours of work. Reacting
to this, we impose the full-time restriction for the 1960 to 1990 pro￿les based on hours last week. After
2000, we compute the di⁄erence in the experience￿ earnings pro￿le generated by implementing the full-time
restriction using these alternative hours measures in 1990, when both measures are available. We then apply
that di⁄erence to impute the experience￿ earnings pro￿les from 2000 on.
13opposite trend can be discerned, especially for college educated workers, with experience￿
earnings pro￿les steepening over time.
A question that arises in the light of the substantial decline in the experience￿ earnings
pro￿le for high school dropouts in Figure 2A is how big a reduction this is. A natural way to
quantify the decline is to compute the capitalized value of the earnings streams illustrated in
Figure 2A. Figure 3 performs this exercise. It plots the capitalized value of the experience￿
earnings pro￿les in Figure 2A, normalized to equal 100 in 1970, for a range of values for the
discount rate. A clear picture emerges: Regardless of the discount rate, the value of the
experience￿ earnings pro￿le for high school dropouts declined by almost 50 percent between
1970 and 2007, a substantial reduction.
Synthetic vs. Actual Cohorts The preceding results report cross￿ sectional experience￿
earnings pro￿les at given points in time. For the purposes of our analysis of the likely
employment e⁄ects of any changes in these pro￿les, we would like to obtain information on
workers￿expectations of their likely experience pro￿le at the time that they are making their
labor supply decisions. It is likely that these cross￿ sectional pro￿les are informative to some
degree on these expectations￿ for instance, if workers have static expectations or changes
are permanent, so that static expectations are rational.
An alternative way of slicing the data, however, would be to plot the realized experience￿
earnings pro￿les of individual cohorts. This alternative approach would be consistent with
workers￿expectations if they were endowed with perfect foresight. The truth, of course, is
likely to lie somewhere between these two extremes, so it is natural to check whether the
basic message of the data changes by shifting perspective in this way.
Figure 4 presents the realized experience￿ earnings pro￿les for the cohorts entering the
labor market in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Since the Census data we use is available
only at a decadal frequency, we plot earnings for members of these cohorts every 10 years.8
8Additionally, we impute data points for 2010 under the assumption that the experience￿ earnings pro￿le
14For high school dropouts, the picture by cohort in Figure 4A tells exactly the same
story as the cross￿ sectional picture in Figure 2A. Wage growth declines for each consecutive
cohort entering the labor market after 1960, and the declines are of similar magnitude as
those indicated by the cross￿ sectional pro￿les in Figure 2A. Likewise, the cohort pro￿les for
high school graduates, and those with college education in Figures 4B, 4C and 4D echo the
patterns observed in their cross￿ sectional counterparts in Figure 2. Most noticeably, it is
again possible to discern a steepening of experience￿ earnings pro￿le among younger cohorts
of college graduates. It is reassuring that these two di⁄erent slices of the data have similar
implications. Since these two approaches have the same message, we use the cross sectional
results of Figure 2 for the simulations in Section IV.
Potential vs. Actual Experience As hinted at earlier, an important potential confound
to the evidence presented in Figures 2 and 4 is that we observe only potential, not actual
experience in the data. A particular cause for concern is that the declines in employment
rates among high school dropouts noted in Figure 1 have led to a widening of the gap between
potential and actual experience among this group of workers. Consequently, it is possible
that this could account for some of the ￿ attening of the observed relationship between mean
log earnings and potential experience in Figures 2A and 4A, as older workers with high
potential experience increasingly accumulate fewer years of actual experience, and thereby
earn less.
Reacting to this, we perform a simple exercise that we believe provides an upper bound
on the magnitude of this e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, imagine, counterfactually, that employment
is i.i.d. across workers at any given point in time. In steady state, this will imply that
the actual experience of a worker is simply equal to the employment rate multiplied by
potential experience. It follows that, in this environment, accounting for the di⁄erence
between potential and actual experience amounts simply to a rescaling of the horizontal axis
in 2010 will be the same as that in the pooled 2001 to 2007 ACS samples.
15in Figure 2A, by a proportion equal to the employment rate. To see why such an exercise
provides an upper bound for the magnitude of these e⁄ects, note that employment is not
i.i.d. across workers, but is rather a persistent process. In particular, by focusing on full-
time, full-year workers we are considering workers who are more than averagely attached to
the labor market.
Figure 5 presents the results of this exercise. It illustrates the potential experience￿
earnings pro￿les from Figure 2A for 1970 and 2000, as well as the implied actual experience￿
earnings pro￿les that would obtain by rescaling the horizontal axis by the trend employment
rates in 1970 and 2000 respectively.9 Figure 5 shows that, although some of the ￿ attening of
the experience￿ earnings pro￿le can be accounted for by a widening gap between potential and
actual experience, the magnitude of these e⁄ects is likely to be small. Even after accounting
for an upper bound on these e⁄ects, after ￿ve to ten years of experience earnings remain
around 45 log points lower in 2000 compared to 1970. In Appendix B, we report estimates
of the di⁄erence between potential and actual experience among high school dropouts over
time using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. These estimates con￿rm that the exercise
underlying Figure 5 is likely to be an upper bound.
Selection Additional potential confounds that may a⁄ect our ￿nding of a ￿ attening of the
experience￿ earnings pro￿les among high school dropouts relate to forms of selection that
vary over time. We highlight two of these possibilities here. First, since the fraction of
each cohort of workers that are high school dropouts has fallen over time, it is natural to
conjecture that dropouts have become increasingly lower skilled over time. An implication of
this would be that, at any given point in time, measured experience￿ earnings pro￿les among
dropouts would overstate the return to experience, since older dropouts are of higher quality
9The trend employment rates used are 10 percent and 25 percent for 1970 and 2000 respectively (see
Figure 1). More complicated corrections that relax the steady state assumption and account for time
variation in employment rates that workers of di⁄erent levels of potential experience have faced in their
working lives yield very similar pictures.
16than their younger counterparts for a reason unrelated to their accumulation of experience.
Thus, selection of this sort could lead to a spurious ￿ attening of the experience pro￿le if the
dropout rate were to fall over time at a decreasing rate.
Recent research suggests that this is unlikely to be a concern over the sample period.
In fact, the notion that high school dropouts have become increasingly lower skilled over
time receives little support in careful analyses of graduation rates in the U.S. Heckman and
LaFontaine (2007) demonstrate that most of the decline in headline dropout rates among
white males (e.g. from the National Center of Education Statistics) can be attributed to
increases in the fraction of GED recipients in successive cohorts. In addition, Heckman and
Rubinstein (2001) and Heckman and LaFontaine (2006) argue that, while such GED recipi-
ents exhibit similar cognitive ability to high school graduates, their labor market outcomes
mirror those of high school dropouts. This suggests that compositional changes related to
increased take up of the GED are unlikely to explain our results for dropouts.10
A second potential form of selection can arise if there are heterogeneous returns to ex-
perience across workers. In such an environment, one would expect individuals with high
returns to labor market experience to be more likely to choose to work. Since the experience￿
earnings pro￿les in Figure 2 depict the average returns to experience among those that choose
to work, it is likely that they overstate the average return to experience among the entire
working and non￿ working population.
This source of selection may also vary over time. As employment rates fall among high
school dropouts, the measured return to experience that we observe will report the average
returns for an increasingly select group of workers. Consequently, we would anticipate this
form of selection to lead us to observe a steepening of experience￿ earnings pro￿les, as the
only workers who choose to work will be those with increasingly higher returns to experience.
10Although high school dropouts are our main focus, it is worth noting that the grouping of individuals
with a GED quali￿cation with high school graduates may lead to some spurious steepening of the measured
experience￿ earnings pro￿le for high school graduates. This would tend to work against our ability to account
for increases in nonemployment among high school graduates.
17Comparison with Previous Literature The evidence presented in Figure 2 is not the
￿rst to look at changes in returns to experience by skill. A number of studies in the literature
on wage inequality has estimated the ￿experience premium,￿measured as the log wage gap
between experienced workers (typically with 25 years of experience) and less experienced
workers (5 years of experience) using Current Population Survey data (see, for example, Katz
and Murphy, 1992; Weinberg, 2005; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). These studies all have
documented evidence for a rise in the experience premium among high school graduates and
college graduates over time.
A natural question, then, is whether the evidence presented in Figure 2 using Census and
ACS data is consistent with the results of these previous analyses using CPS data. Figure 6
addresses this question by plotting the experience premium by education group across time
using the Census/ACS underlying Figure 2, as well as for comparable CPS samples.
The picture painted in Figure 6 is a relatively reassuring one: Despite some di⁄erences
in the measured levels of the experience premium in the two di⁄erent sources of data, the
trends in the experience premium by skill are consistent over time.11 As reported in the
above￿ cited studies, the experience premium among high school and college graduates has
trended upward over time in both the CPS and Census/ACS samples we use. However,
consistent with the impression in Figure 2A that the experience￿ earnings pro￿le for dropouts
has ￿ attened over time, the experience premium among high school dropouts has trended
downward since 1970 in both data sources. Thus, our empirical works con￿rms earlier
￿ndings in the literature that the return to experience for workers who have at least a high
school education have enjoyed an increase in the return to experience. Our work has the new
and important ￿nding, however, that the workers with the lowest educational attainment
have faced a decrease in the returns to experience.
11While the 25/5 experience premium is a commonly used measure, the high frequency movements observed
in the CPS estimates should be treated with caution due to the low sample sizes available in the CPS. The
standard errors around each datapoint in Figure 6 averaged 0.16 for dropouts, 0.09 for high school graduates,
0.12 for some college, and 0.14 for college graduates.
18B Changes in Aggregate Wage Growth by Skill
We now turn to observed changes in the rate of aggregate wage growth by skill. The measures
that we present are based on data from the March Current Population Survey microdata for
the period 1967 to 2006. We focus our sample on non￿ immigrant white males aged 16 to
64 with fewer than 30 years of potential experience who report that they were out of school
for the entire year and are not self￿ employed.12 Wages are measured by dividing annual
wages and salary by annual hours worked. Mirroring our analysis of experience pro￿les, we
again proxy skill using discrete education categories: high school dropouts (9 to 11 years),
high school graduates (12 years), some college (13 to 15 years), and college degree or higher
(16+ years).13
Figure 7 plots trend hourly wage growth by education from 1968 through to 2006 based
on these CPS samples. Speci￿cally, this takes estimates of real hourly wages by education,
computes implied annual wage growth by education, and reports the HP ￿ltered series.
This exercise reveals a clear picture of aggregate wage growth in recent decades: For all
educational groups, aggregate wage growth fell in 1970s, rebounded in the 1980s and 1990s,
and has fallen o⁄ again in recent years. In addition, we observe that trend wage growth
declined more acutely among low￿ skilled workers in the 1970s. Among high school dropouts,
wage growth declined secularly in the 1970s from around 3 percent per year to trend real wage
declines of approximately 3 percent in late 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, real wage
growth among college educated workers declined more slowly in the 1970s, and rebounded
more robustly in the 1990s.14
12These sample restrictions parallel those in Juhn, Murphy and Topel￿ s (1991, 2002) in￿ uential analyses
of wages and employment by skill in the U.S.
13Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002) measure skill by percentiles of the wage distribution, rather than
by educational groups. Reassuringly, they obtain similar results.
14A potentially important confound to the trends in Figure 7 is the growth of non￿ wage compensation
(such as health insurance, pensions and paid leave) that emerged over the period. It is di¢ cult to get
an accurate sense of this from the data sources we use. However, using the microdata underlying the
Employment Cost Index, Pierce (2001) shows that wage growth understated compensation growth among
high￿ skilled workers in the 1980s, but that it overstated compensation growth among the low￿ skilled in the
1990s. Hence, for total compensation the relative growth rate in wages for low-skilled workers is likely to
19These observations echo well￿ documented facts on aggregate growth, as well as wages
by skill. The secular decline and subsequent rebound in aggregate wage growth over time
mirrors the productivity slowdown of the 1970s as well as the so￿ called ￿productivity miracle￿
of the 1990s in the U.S. Figure 7 overlays the trend productivity growth rate over the same
period to emphasize these trends. Likewise, the observation that wage growth declined
more sharply among the low￿ skilled in the late 1970s and 1980s is consistent with the widely
documented increase in wage inequality that emerged over that period.
IV Quantitative Implications
The preceding sections have outlined a number of key results. Section II showed that, in
a labor market with positive returns to experience, there are good reasons to expect that
changes in experience￿ earnings pro￿les and aggregate wage growth will have important ef-
fects on equilibrium rates of employment. In addition, Section II emphasized that such
e⁄ects are likely to be strongest among low￿ skilled workers who are marginal to the employ-
ment decision. Then, in section III, we documented strong evidence for a decline in the
experience￿ earnings pro￿le of high school dropouts. In addition, we provided evidence for
substantial declines in aggregate wage growth in the 1970s and 1980s, which were particularly
acute for low￿ skilled, marginal workers.
A natural question in the light of these results is what the likely e⁄ects are of the observed
changes in experience￿ earnings pro￿les and aggregate wage growth on the aggregate rates
of nonemployment documented in Figure 1. Section II provided a simple qualitative model
of these e⁄ects. To get a sense for the magnitude of the implied e⁄ects, we now analyze a
more general model of labor supply in the presence of returns to experience.
be even less favorable than shown in Figure 7.
20A A More General Model
The model of the Section II is simpli￿ed in a number of respects. In this section we relax
some of these simplifying assumptions. First, we allow for ￿nite worker lifetimes. This
enables discussion of the di⁄erential e⁄ects of changes in wage growth across di⁄erent cohorts
of workers in a natural way. Second, we allow the return to experience to be nonlinear to
allow for the concavity of the experience￿ log earnings pro￿le observed in Figures 2 and 4.
This allows us to match the experience￿ earnings pro￿le in the model with that observed in
the data. Third, we allow workers to choose whether to work or not at all times in their
lives, thereby relaxing the once-and-for-all labor supply decision of Section II. We will see
that extending the model in this manner will allow us to draw out the dynamic e⁄ects of
changes in rates of wage growth on employment in and out of steady state. Though more
realistic, we will see that these changes do not change the basic qualitative message of the
simple model of Section II.
Consider a worker entering the labor market at time s with a working life of length T.
At each point in time the individual chooses whether he wants to work (h = 1) or not work
(h = 0). As in the model of Section II, for every year he works, he accumulates a year of
labor market experience, x; he does not accumulate experience while not working. A worker
of experience x at time t receives a ￿ ow wage equal to w(x;t).15 An individual who does
not work at time t receives a ￿ ow payo⁄ b(t). The worker makes his labor supply decision
in order to maximize the present discounted value of his lifetime income.
Thus, we can state the optimization problem of an individual entering the labor market






￿r(t￿s)y (x;t;h)dt s.t. _ x = h, h 2 f0;1g, x(s) = 0; (9)
where r is the real interest rate. The individual￿ s income at time t is given by y (x;t;h) =
15In this more elaborate model, we suppress the i subscript that indexes individuals for purposes of clarity.
21hw(x;t) + (1 ￿ h)b(t). If the individual works (h = 1) he receives the wage; otherwise, he
receives the payo⁄from not working. The ￿rst constraint in (9) regulates the accumulation
of experience over the worker￿ s lifetime such that experience is accumulated only when the
individual works. The second emphasizes our focus on the extensive margin of the labor
supply decision. And the third constraint states the initial condition that new entrants into
the labor market enter with no accumulated experience.
The maximization problem in equation (9) can be restated more simply as an optimal
control problem with associated Hamiltonian
H (x;t;h;￿) = hw(x;t) + (1 ￿ h)b(t) + ￿h: (10)
Note that the Hamiltonian is linear in the labor supply variable, h. It follows that an
individual with experience x at time t will work if the wage o⁄er w(x;t) exceeds a reservation
wage given by
wR (t) = b(t) ￿ ￿(t); (11)
where we will see that ￿(t) ￿ 0. Thus, just as in the simple model of Section II, we
observe that the reservation wage lies below the ￿ ow payo⁄ from nonemployment. As
before, individuals are willing to forgo payo⁄s in the short run in order to reap the returns
to experience in the long run.
To characterize the reservation wage more precisely, however, we must describe the vari-
able ￿ in more detail. Using the principles of optimal control, it is simple to show that ￿






16From the principles of optimal control, we can write _ ￿ = r￿(t)￿@H=@x = r￿(t)￿h(x;t)wx (x;t). The
solution to this di⁄erential equation is given in equation (12). The constant of integration is equal to zero
because of the transversality condition that ￿(s + T) = 0.
22Thus, ￿ has a very intuitive interpretation. It is the cumulative discounted sum of future
returns to experience, wx (x(￿);￿), taking into account that these future returns accrue only
in the event that the individual works in the future (h(x(￿);￿) = 1). In short, ￿ is the
marginal value of experience to a worker.
This simple interpretation in turn delivers a simple interpretation of the reservation wage.
In particular, we can rewrite the reservation wage as





Thus, the reservation wage is equal to the ￿ ow bene￿t from not working, b(t), less the
opportunity costs of not working, which equals the foregone returns to experience. As stated,
the reservation wage is a very forward looking object￿ it depends on the entire sequence of
future labor supply decisions from time t until the end of the individual￿ s life, s + T. To
obtain a more concrete sense of the form of the reservation wage, we need to partition
the individual￿ s remaining lifetime into episodes allocated respectively to employment and
nonemployment. This is aided by the following result:
Proposition 1 If (i) r ￿ gw > 0, so that workers discount the future; (ii) the experience￿
earnings pro￿le is monotonically increasing;17 and (iii) there are no shocks, then a worker
who decides to work at time t subsequently will work for the remainder of his working life.
Intuitively, consider an individual who is just about to start working. By de￿nition, such
an individual only just prefers working over not working. As the individual works, however,
he accumulates human capital which in turn serves only to make employment increasingly
preferable relative to not working. As a result, the individual continues to work until he
17Assuming that wx (x;t) > 0 for all x and t is not entirely innocuous. Evidence suggests that average
real wages can decline with experience at the end of a worker￿ s career. However, it is not clear whether
this is driven by (partial) retirement. For the horizons we focus on in what follows (the ￿rst forty years of
working life) this is not such a bad assumption. An extension of the model to account for optimal retirement
would be an interesting topic for future research.
23retires.
In the light of this, we adopt the convention that, whenever the individual is o⁄ered his
reservation wage, he works thereafter. It follows that, for an individual with experience x
at time t, we can substitute h(x(￿);￿) = 1 and x(￿) = x + ￿ ￿ t for all ￿ > t into the
reservation wage equation above to derive




￿r(￿￿t)wx (x + ￿ ￿ t;￿)d￿: (14)
To complete our characterization of the reservation wage, we must be more explicit about
the form of the wage equation. Denoting aggregate wage growth by gw, and the return to
experience at x years of experience as gx (x) ￿ @ lnw(x;￿)=@x allows one to write









t [r￿gw￿gx(x+z￿t)]dzgx (x + ￿ ￿ t)d￿
￿￿1
:(15)
Although the form of the reservation wage in this more general model does not appear
straightforward, a number of observations can be made in the light of it. First, note that
the reservation wage takes a form that is reminiscent of equation (4) from the simple model
of Section II: The reservation wage is equal to the ￿ ow payo⁄from not working b(t), scaled
down by a factor ￿(x;s;t) ￿ 1. As emphasized before, workers are willing to forgo current
earnings to reap the returns to experience in the future. The return to experience drives a
wedge ￿(x;s;t) between the payo⁄ from nonemployment and the reservation wage.
Second, note that in the case where individuals are in￿nitely lived, T ! 1, and the return
to experience is constant for all levels of x, gx (x) ￿ gx, then ￿(x;s;t) ! 1￿[gx=(r ￿ gw)] = ￿
from equation (4). Thus, the general model nests the simple model of Section II as a special
case.18
18Note also that the once-and-for-all labor supply assumption in the simple model of Section II is therefore
not a binding one. This, of course, follows from Proposition 1.
24In addition, we again observe that changes in the experience￿ earnings pro￿le, summarized
by gx (￿), and aggregate wage growth, gw, a⁄ect the reservation wage. As before, increases in
the experience￿ earnings pro￿le and aggregate wage growth reduce ￿(x;s;t), thereby lowering
the reservation wage and stimulating work incentives. The di⁄erence in equation (15) is
that, by taking into account ￿nite lifetimes and concave experience￿ earnings pro￿les, the
magnitudes of these e⁄ects are likely to be more sensible.
A ￿nal key message of equation (15) is the implied life￿ cycle e⁄ects of changes in gx (￿) and
gw. Speci￿cally, the marginal e⁄ects of these changes on the reservation wage are stronger for
younger cohorts at a given point in time t and weaker for older cohorts. To see this, consider
equation (15) and recall that s denotes time of entry into the labor market, so that higher
values of s refer to younger cohorts. Mechanically, this result arises because older workers
have a shorter remaining working life over which changes in wage growth of any variety can
a⁄ect the present value of their remaining earnings stream. More intuitively, as workers
age, they become increasingly less marginal to the employment decision, and consequently
respond less to changes in wage growth.19 We will see in what follows that these life￿ cycle
e⁄ects have distinctive implications for the dynamics of employment generated by the model.
B Implications for Low￿ Skilled Joblessness
The results of Section III documented evidence for reductions in the return to labor market
experience for low-skilled, marginal workers since 1970, as well as important changes in
aggregate wage growth for such workers over the same period. We now seek to provide a
quantitative sense of the implications of these trends for work incentives and equilibrium
employment. To do this, we feed the observed trends in the experience￿ earnings pro￿le and
aggregate wage growth into a simulated version of the general model summarized in equation
19By the same token, it is also true that the reservation wage coe¢ cient ￿(x;s;t) is larger for older cohorts.
One might imagine that this reduces work incentives for older workers. However, we know from Proposition
1 that any individual who starts working will work until retirement. The reason is the wage growth that
workers receive as they accumulate experience.
25(15). Since the trends in the aggregate nonemployment rate are driven by the increase in
nonemployment among low￿ skilled workers, we focus on generating the implied outcomes
for high school dropouts.
We set the length of a working life to 40 years, and initialize the model in steady state
in 1970. We set the initial steady￿ state employment rate to equal 90 percent based on the
observed trend nonemployment rate for high school dropouts in 1970 (see Figure 1B). We
then compute the implied paths of the employment rate for each experience x, cohort s and
time t con￿guration by extending the simple insight of equation (5):
￿lnL(x;s;t) = " ￿ ￿ln￿(x;s;t); (16)
where variation in the reservation wage coe¢ cient ￿(x;s;t) is induced by variation in aggre-
gate wage growth gw and the experience￿ earnings pro￿le gx (￿). Finally, we aggregate across
(x;s;t) cells to compute the path of aggregate employment, L(t).
Our simulation procedure therefore reduces the problem down to ￿nding a value of ", the
elasticity of labor supply. Recall from our earlier discussion that, for our purposes, " is the
elasticity of labor supply on the extensive margin￿ the elasticity of the inverse distribution
function of reservation wages (see equations (6) and (8)). Estimates of " for di⁄erent skill
groups are reported by Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002). Speci￿cally, they compute
estimates of the elasticity of the fraction of a year spent in employment with respect to wages
by skill using Current Population Survey data. As mentioned in our discussion of trends
in aggregate wage growth in section III.B, Juhn, Murphy and Topel measure skill by ranges
of percentiles of the wage distribution.20 Since high school dropouts lie in the bottom 20
percent of the education distribution, Juhn, Murphy and Topel￿ s estimates suggest that a
20To do this, Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002) estimate the wage o⁄ers of those out of employment.
They do this by imputing wages to nonworkers using the distribution of wages among individuals who worked
between 1 and 13 weeks in a given year.
26reasonable value of " is approximately 0.33.21
It is worth noting that our simulation strategy has a number of virtues. First, by
reducing the procedure down simply to obtaining a value for ", we have avoided having to
explicitly calibrate variables such as the replacement rate ￿, or the distribution of worker
heterogeneity ￿(￿) in equation (3). Since we might be less con￿dent in the correct calibration
of these objects, this is a useful simpli￿cation. In addition, the simulation strategy is very
transparent. If one has di⁄erent priors about the appropriate value for the supply elasticity
", all one need do is scale the implied employment e⁄ects up or down accordingly. For
example, if one believed " were double the value we use, then the implied employment
e⁄ects will be double what we report.
A Simple Example To get a sense for the dynamic response of aggregate employment
implied by the model, we ￿rst consider the e⁄ects of a very simple shock. Figure 8 plots the
response of aggregate nonemployment to a one￿ time, permanent, unanticipated decline in
aggregate wage growth gw from 3 percent (as observed in the early 1970s among dropouts)
to ￿ 3 percent (as observed in the mid 1980s among dropouts). The dashed line plots the
steady state nonemployment rate before and after the shock. This rises substantially from
10 percent to approximately 20 percent.
The response of the nonemployment rate out of steady state, however, reveals important
transitional dynamics in the model. On impact, a discrete fraction of workers immediately
leaves employment, deciding that the reduction in lifetime earnings renders working no longer
worthwhile. Subsequently, the nonemployment rate exhibits very slow transitional dynamics,
eventually reaching the new steady state after 40 years. These transitional dynamics are
a direct consequence of the life￿ cycle response to shocks emphasized in the general model
21Table 10 of their 2002 Brookings paper reports partial elasticities (i.e. the change in employment divided
by the log change in wage) by skill percentiles for the years 1972 to 2000. For the 1st to 10th percentile,
their estimate of the partial elasticity is 0.287; for the 11th to 20th percentile, 0.217. These imply elasticities
of approximately 0.39 and 0.27 respectively. Our choice of " = 0:33 is an approximate midpoint of these
estimates.
27above. As workers age, they become increasingly less marginal to the employment decision,
and thereby become less responsive to shocks. What is driving the dynamics in Figure 8 is
the turnover of successive cohorts in the labor market as older cohorts retire, and younger,
more marginal workers enter. It is therefore no surprise that the period of transition is
exactly 40 years, the speci￿ed length of a working life, since that is the time it takes for all
older cohorts at the time of the shock to leave the labor market.
Simulation Results We can now address the question of the e⁄ects of observed changes
in the experience￿ earnings pro￿le and aggregate wage growth for rates of nonemployment
among high school dropouts. We match the return to experience in the model, gx (￿), to
smoothed versions of the cross￿ sectional pro￿les for high school dropouts in Figure 2A.22
Aggregate wage growth in the model, gw, is matched to trend wage growth among high
school dropouts based on the estimates in Figure 7. We then feed these trends into the
model as a series of unanticipated shocks. Figure 9 displays the results of this exercise,
together with the trend nonemployment rate among high school dropouts from Figure 1B
for comparison.
The model predicts a substantial rise in the nonemployment rate for low-skilled workers.
Figure 9 reveals that the joint trends in gx (￿) and gw together imply an increase in low￿ skilled
nonemployment from 10 percent to 24 percent between 1968 and 2006. Comparing these
outcomes to the observed trend from the data, this suggests that the model can account
for most of the secular rise in nonemployment among high school dropouts over this period.
Thus, variation in the returns to experience together with changes in the rate of aggregate
wage growth have the potential to go a long way toward explaining the long￿ run variation
in nonemployment for low skilled workers in the context of this model.
However, Figure 9 also suggests that the model is less successful in matching the observed
22In practice, a speci￿cation that relates log earnings to a power function in experience provides a good
￿t.
28timing of the increase in trend nonemployment among high school dropouts. The data reveal
a substantial medium run rise in nonemployment in the 1970s and 1980s that the model does
not fully predict. This may partly be due to our choice to feed variation in gx (￿) and gw
through the model as unanticipated shocks. It is possible that some of these changes may
eventually have been anticipated. For example, workers may have become wise to the
downward trend in aggregate wage growth seen in Figure 7. This would speed up the
response of nonemployment to these shocks.
More generally, we do not necessarily view the model￿ s inability to predict the medium
run rise in joblessness as a problem, as it provides room for other explanations to play a role.
Most notably, Juhn, Murphy and Topel￿ s (1991, 2002) suggestion that the decline in demand
for low￿ skilled workers associated with the increase in wage inequality that occurred in the
1970s and 1980s played an important role could account for the sharp rise in joblessness in
the 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 9 also plots the implied trends in nonemployment from allowing the return to
experience and aggregate wage growth to vary independently. This suggests that, between
1968 and 2006, changes in aggregate wage growth and experience￿ earnings pro￿les accounted
for about an equal share of the implied increase in low￿ skilled nonemployment in the model.
However, it also reveals that the e⁄ects of gw are relatively more important earlier on, whereas
the return to experience plays more of a role later on. This is consistent with the trends
depicted in Figures 2A and 7. Declines in aggregate wage growth occur predominantly in
the early part of the sample period, whereas declines in the return to experience among
dropouts occur much more uniformly over the period.
C Implications for the Age Distribution of Joblessness
As a ￿nal check on the implications of our model, we also explore the implied age structure of
the rise in nonemployment. We do this because our model has distinctive life￿ cycle predic-
29tions. Speci￿cally, recall that the model implies that older workers become less responsive to
wage growth shocks, because such shocks have a smaller relative impact on their remaining
lifetime earnings. It follows that the shocks that we observe in the data are predicted to
have a more immediate impact on the employment rates of younger workers relative to older
workers.
To examine this possibility, we partition workers in our simulated model into those who
have lived fewer than twenty years of their working life, and those who have lived more
than twenty years. Figure 10A plots the nonemployment rates for each of these groups
predicted by the model. Consistent with our intuition, we observe the nonemployment rate
for younger workers rising earlier and faster than that for older workers. Eventually, these
converge as older workers increasingly have responded to the deterioration of wage growth
in the past.
Figure 10B plots the analogous picture using data from the Current Population Survey.
It displays the trend nonemployment rates for workers above and below the age of 40. The
qualitative picture presented in Figure 10B is remarkably similar to the model￿ s predictions
in Figure 10A. The nonemployment rate among younger workers rises earlier and faster than
for older workers. And the nonemployment rates converge in the later period in a manner
similar to that implied by the model. However, as we observed with the aggregate results
presented in Figure 9, the timing and magnitude of the model￿ s predicted e⁄ects are not as
successful. Nonemployment rates in the data rise faster and to a greater degree compared
to that implied by the model.
D Implications for Aggregate Nonemployment
Up to now, we have focused on implied trends in joblessness among low￿ skilled high school
dropouts. In this subsection, we compute implied trends in nonemployment rates for the
remaining skill groups. Our simulation procedure mirrors exactly the method described for
30high school dropouts in section IV.B. For each skill group, we feed the observed changes in
the experience￿ earnings pro￿le and aggregate wage growth in Figures 2 and 7 through the
model as a series of unanticipated shocks. The only adjustment made is for di⁄erences in
the extensive elasticity of labor supply " across skill groups. The results of section II.B.
lead us to expect that " declines with skill, as more skilled workers are less marginal to the
employment decision. The estimates reported in Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991, 2002)
con￿rm this intuition. Based on those estimates, we apply values of " equal to 0.2, 0.1, and
0.066 respectively for high school graduates, those with some college education, and those
with a college degree or higher. Again, note that the e⁄ects of di⁄erent assumptions on the
magnitude of these elasticities are simply to rescale our reported employment e⁄ects up or
down respectively.
Figure 11 plots trend nonemployment rates implied by our simulations, together with
trend nonemployment rates from the data. Figure 9 for high school dropouts is replicated
for ease of comparison. Figure 11 suggests that observed trends in experience￿ earnings
pro￿les and aggregate wage growth can account for around 5 of the 10 percentage point
increase in nonemployment among high school graduates, and 3 of the 5 percentage point
increase for those with some college education. Consistent with the relative stability of
the experience￿ earnings pro￿les for these groups in Figure 2, the majority of the implied
increase in joblessness among both groups is driven by declines in aggregate wage growth.
Figure 11 also reveals that trends in either form of wage growth can explain none of the 2
to 3 percentage point increase in nonemployment among college graduates.
The results in Figure 11 also allow us to gauge the extent to which variation in wage
growth can account for the increase in aggregate nonemployment depicted in Figure 1A. We
take a share￿ weighted average of the simulations in Figure 11. These simulated changes
in the nonemployment rates by education group aggregate to 3.4 percentage points￿ a little
more than half of the 6 percentage point rise observed in Figure 1A.
31V Related Literature
The methods and results of our analysis touch on a wide array of related literatures. First, we
have shown that a distinctive feature of our model is that it generates a role for productivity
growth in explaining variation in steady state employment that is absent in standard models
of long run employment determination. An important implication of this is that it provides
a rationale for why the declines in aggregate wage growth that accompanied the productivity
slowdown of the 1970s are related to increases in rates of joblessness.
Perhaps because prevailing models tend to predict no long run employment e⁄ects of
changes in productivity growth, however, a prominent feature of previous literature has been
in its emphasis on the potential short run employment e⁄ects of variation in productivity
growth (see among others Blanchard, 2000; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Ball and Mo¢ tt, 2001).
A popular idea that has been pursued is that the wage demands of workers are somewhat
sluggish in their response to changes in productivity growth. Blanchard (2000) has suggested
that a ￿comprehension lag￿can arise between the moment of an initial decline in productivity
growth and the time that workers become aware of it. Similarly, Ball and Mo¢ tt (2001) have
emphasized the possibility of sluggish ￿wage aspirations￿that do not adjust immediately to
declines in the sustainable rate of aggregate wage growth. Both of these possibilities will lead
to a short run rise in joblessness. Moreover, depending on the sluggishness of reservation
wages, the short run can last a long time.
A limitation to this approach, emphasized in Blanchard (1998), is that it becomes dif-
￿cult to explain very persistent declines in employment following a productivity slowdown,
unless one is willing to impose extreme forms of sluggishness in reservation wages. Such
a task becomes especially di¢ cult given the observed rebound in aggregate wage growth
that accompanied the productivity ￿miracle￿of the 1990s. Models of sluggish adjustment
in reservation wages would predict reductions in joblessness in the 1990s, contrary to the
evidence presented in Figures 1A and 1B.
32Interestingly, our model contrasts with these predictions. The results of Section IV imply
that the the productivity slowdown of the 1970s led to increased joblessness over long (thirty
year) horizons, rather than short horizons. Thus, while models of sluggish adjustment in
reservation wages may account for the short to medium run rise in joblessness in the 1970s
and 1980s, our model can account for the persistent rise in nonemployment into the 1990s.
Recall that this is driven by the important employment dynamics that are emphasized when
one takes into account the e⁄ects of human capital accumulation on work incentives over the
lifecycle.
An important exception to the Blanchard￿ s (2000) rule that models of the aggregate
labor market ￿deliver, to a ￿rst order, long run neutrality of unemployment to productivity
growth￿are models of creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). In such models,
the productivity of a job is ￿xed according to the state of the art technology available
upon creation of the employment relationship. In order to update productivity back to
the frontier, older relationships must be severed, hence ￿creative destruction.￿ A drawback
to models in this vein is that they can have counterfactual predictions with respect to the
e⁄ects of productivity growth on rates of worker reallocation and the level of unemployment
(Blanchard, 1998). Viewed through the lens of these models, declines in productivity growth,
such as the slowdown in the 1970s, imply that the rate at which jobs become obsolete slows,
reducing job destruction, and thereby unemployment. In contrast to these predictions, the
productivity slowdown in the U.S. was characterized by increased rates of job destruction,
and increased unemployment.23;24
A second area of related research is the adundant literature on post￿ schooling investment
in human capital, based on the seminal work of Ben-Porath (1967) (see Weiss and Rubinstein,
23Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) emphasize that these results depend crucially on the creative destruction
assumption that technological change is embodied only in newly created jobs.
24Another exception is the analysis of Manning (1990). He shows that reductions in productivity growth
can lead to increased unemployment in the context of a dynamic model of union bargaining. In his model,
slower productivity growth reduces the future rents from employment available to workers. Consequently,
unions capture rents in the present, raising wage pressure, and increasing unemployment.
332006, for a survey). Much of this literature has highlighted the implications of the joint
determination of human capital accumulation and labor supply for the life cycle pro￿les of
earnings and hours worked (Blinder and Weiss, 1976; Heckman, 1976; Ryder, Sta⁄ord and
Stephan, 1976), education choice (Willis and Rosen, 1979) and the estimation of preference
and technology parameters (Shaw, 1989; Lee, 2008). Perhaps most related to the present
paper is the analysis of Olivetti (2006), who emphasizes the role of changes in returns to
experience among women since the 1970s. In contrast to our analysis of low￿ skilled males,
she ￿nds evidence of steepening experience￿ earnings pro￿les among women, and identi￿es it
as a key driving force for increased female labor force participation since the 1970s.
VI Summary and Discussion
Rates of joblessness among males in the U.S. have risen dramatically since the 1970s. These
trends are particularly acute among the low￿ skilled. This paper provides an economic
rationale through which changes in wage growth￿ both aggregate wage growth across time,
and wage growth associated with the accumulation of work experience￿ may have an e⁄ect
on work incentives. Evidence suggests that both forms of wage growth have deteriorated
since the 1970s, especially among the low￿ skilled. Application of these trends to a model
of labor supply in the presence of wage growth indicates that declining wage growth can
account for much of the increase in nonemployment among low￿ skilled males in the U.S.
since 1970.
A number of important issues arise for future work in the light of these results. First, in
an economy such as the U.S. with limited social insurance mechanisms, it is natural to ask
what sources of income individuals have at their disposal when they experience persistent
periods out of work, as they do in available data (Juhn, Murphy and Topel, 1991, 2002).
Potential sources may include income from intermittent employment spells with limited
scope for human capital accumulation, and income of other household members (which may
34interact with increases in female labor market participation over time). Future study of these
alternative income sources would shed important light on why employment rates among the
low￿ skilled have been so elastic over time.
Second, the present analysis has posed the question of what the optimal labor supply
response should be given the deterioration in wage growth we observe in the data. A natural
question is why wage growth changed as it did. Of particular interest is why the experience￿
earnings pro￿les among male high school dropouts ￿ attened since the 1970s. Our analysis
suggests this is unlikely to be related to increased di⁄erences between potential and actual
experience, sources of selection over time, or to particular data sources. Further analysis
of the determinants of the returns to experience seems warranted to provide a coherent
explanation for these trends.
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38VIII Appendix
A Theoretical Results
Derivation of Equation (1) Imagine ￿rms face a constant returns to scale production
technology that uses e¢ ciency units of labor A(x;t)n, as well as capital k to produce output
y according to
y = F (A(x;t)n;k), where A(x;t) ￿ e
gwt+gxx: (17)
From the linear homogeneity of the production technology, the marginal products are ho-
mogeneous of degree zero, so that we can write













, for j = 1;2: (18)




where pk is the price of capital. Substituting into the ￿rst order condition for optimal













yields the equation (1) stated in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider a worker with experience x at time t who is just indif-
ferent to working, so that w(x;t) = wR (x;t). Note that the time derivative of the market
wage is given by
_ w = gww(x;t) + h(x;t)wx (x;t); (19)
since _ x = h(x;t). Likewise, noting that _ b = gwb(t), and _ ￿ = r￿(t) ￿ h(x;t)wx (x;t), the
time derivative of the reservation wage is given by
_ wR = gwwR (t) ￿ (r ￿ gw)￿(t) + h(x;t)wx (x;t): (20)
39It follows that, when the individual is just indi⁄erent between working or not, the time
derivative of the di⁄erence between the wage and the reservation wage is given by
( _ w ￿ _ wR)jw=wR = (r ￿ gw)￿(t): (21)
Under the assumptions that r ￿ gw > 0 and wx (x(￿);￿) > 0 for all ￿, the shadow value of





> 0 if h(￿) = 1 for any ￿ > t;
= 0 if h(￿) = 0 for all ￿ > t:
(22)
Given this, we can conclude that




> 0 if h(￿) = 1 for any ￿ > t;
= 0 if h(￿) = 0 for all ￿ > t:
(23)
Equation (23) implies that, whenever a worker is indi⁄erent between working or not at a
point in time, two outcomes are possible: If he intends to work at any point in the future,
he will start working now and will work for the rest of his life, since his o⁄ered market wage
is rising above his reservation wage from below. On the other hand, if he never intends to
work in the future, he will be indi⁄erent between working and not working for the rest of
his life. It follows that any wage o⁄er slightly above the reservation wage will lead a worker
to work for the rest of his life, and any o⁄er slightly below his reservation wage will lead a
worker to not work for the rest of his life.
B Potential vs. Actual Experience in PSID Data
A potential confound to the evidence of a ￿ attening of the observed potential experience
earnings pro￿le among high school dropouts in Figures 2A and 4A is that the gap between
40potential and actual labor market experience widened for this group of workers over time
as their employment rates fell. Figure 5 provides an upper bound on the size of this e⁄ect
by assuming that employment is i.i.d. across workers, so that actual experience is well
approximated by the employment rate times potential experience.
As mentioned in the main text, the latter is an upper bound since employment is unlikely
to be i.i.d. across workers, especially among the full time full year workers that we focus on.
In this appendix, we use data from the core sample of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
to explore this possibility further. The sample restrictions imposed mirror those used in
the Census samples described in the main text. We focus on full time full year white male
household heads aged 16 to 64 with 9 to 11 years of completed schooling.
Potential experience is constructed as age minus years of completed schooling minus six.25
Actual experience is constructed as follows. In the ￿rst year a respondent is observed, the
actual experience calendar is intialized using data on the number of years worked since age
18.26 Actual experience is then updated in each consecutive survey by adding the fraction of
weeks worked in the survey year to the cumulative value of actual experience in prior years.
Figure B1 presents the results of this exercise for PSID data pertaining to the years
1967 to 1996.27 It plots measures of average actual experience against potential experience
from the method described above. Years of data are pooled into three groups to obtain
larger sample sizes. The results suggest that there has indeed been a divergence between
potential and actual experience in the later years of the sample, consistent with the fact
that employment rates have fallen among high school dropouts. However, the magnitudes
25Years of completed schooling are available only in intervals for the years 1969 to 1974 inclusive. For
those years, years of schooling equal are set equal to the value reported in 1968, if it is observed and is
consistent with the intervalled variable in subsequent surveys. Otherwise, we assign the midpoint value of
the intervalled data.
26Data on the number of years worked since age 18 is unavailable prior to 1974. Consequently, respondents
who worked only prior to 1974 were excluded. For respondents who worked before and after 1974, the number
of years worked is backcasted using information in the pre-1974 surveys on whether the respondent worked.
27The switch to a biennial survey in 1997 complicates the construction of the actual experience variable,
since it does not contain data on employment in the year prior to the survey year.
41of these e⁄ects are somewhat smaller than those assumed in Figure 5. There it was assumed
that the ratio of actual to potential experience was equal to 0.9 in 1970, and 0.75 in 2000, the
respective trend employment rates in those two periods. The results in Figure B1 suggest
that the ratio dropped from 0.9 to 0.8, suggesting that the exercise underlying Figure 5 is
indeed an upper bound.
42Figure 1.  Nonemployment Rates for White Males: Aggregate and by Education 
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from March Current Population Survey microdata for white males aged 16 
to 64 with fewer than 30 years of potential experience, who report that they are neither students 
nor self employed.  Nonemployment rates are computed as the fraction of year spent out of work.  
Weeks worked prior to 1976 are intervalled. Nonemployment rates prior to 1976 are computed 
by applying within-interval means from post-1976 data to pre-1976 data.  Bold black lines are 



















































































































































































B. Nonemployment Rates by Education
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Potential Experience,  Years
B. 12 Years of Education
1960 1970 1980
1990 2000 2001-07Figure 2. Experience-Earnings Profiles, by Education and Census Year (continued) 
 
Notes:  Profiles are based on data for full-time, full-year white males aged 16 to 64 from the 
1960 to 2000 decennial Censuses, and pooled 2001 to 2007 American Community Survey 
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Potential Experience,  Years
D. 16+ Years of Education
1960 1970 1980
1990 2000 2001-07Figure 3. Capitalized Value of Earnings, Normalized to 1970, 9-11 Years of Education, by 
Census Year and Discount Rate 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations of the capitalized value of earnings over a thirty year horizon, 
discounted at rate r, and normalized to equal 100 in 1970.  Data used for the calculation are the 



























































r = 0.033 r = 0.04
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Potential Experience,  Years
B: 12 Years of Education
1960 1970 1980
1990 2000Figure 4.  Earnings Profiles by Cohort and Education (continued) 
 
Notes:  Profiles are based on same data as those underlying Figure 2. Mean log earnings are 
normalized by the mean log earnings of workers entering the labor market. Data points for 2010 
are imputed under the assumption that the experience-earnings profile from pooled 2001 to 2007 
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Potential Experience,  Years
D: 16+ Years of Education
1960 1970 1980
1990 2000Figure 5.  Potential vs. Actual Experience and Changes in Experience-Earnings Profiles among 




Notes. Non-dashed lines are cross-sectional potential experience-earnings profiles among full-
time, full-year white males aged 16 to 64 from the 1970 and 2000 decennial Censuses replicated 
from Figure 3A. Dashed lines represent actual experience-earnings profiles that would be 
observed under steady state employment rates of 90 percent in 1970 and 75 percent in 2000, 



































Potential /Actual Experience, Years
9-11 Years of Education
1970 (potential) 2000 (potential)
1970 (imputed actual) 2000 (imputed actual)Figure 6. 25/5 Experience Premium by Education: Census vs. Current Population Survey 
 
   
   
 
Notes: The 25/5 experience premium is defined as the difference in mean log earnings among workers with 25 vs. 5 years of 
experience among full-time, full-year white males aged 16 to 64. Data are taken from the decennial Censuses from 1960 to 2000, 
pooled 2001 to 2007 American Community Surveys, and March Current Population Survey microdata. The black bold lines plot linear 
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
D. 16+ Years of Education




Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on March Current Population Survey microdata from 1968 
to 2006.  The series report HP filtered real wage growth by education group.  Data are for white 
males aged 16 to 64 with fewer than 30 years of labor market experience.  Hourly wages are 
computed by dividing weekly wages by weekly hours.  Productivity growth is computed from 


































































9-11 years 12 years 13-15 years 16+ years Productivity GrowthFigure 8.  Simulated Response of Nonemployment Rate to an Unanticipated, Permanent Decline 




Notes: Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Figure plots the response to 
a permanent unanticipated decline in gw from 3 percent to –3 percent.  The discount rate r = 0.04, 





























Dynamic Response Steady state responseFigure 9.  Implied Response of Nonemployment among High School Dropouts to Observed 




Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Observed changes in the 
experience-earnings profile (Figure 2A) and aggregate wage growth (Figure 7) are fed through 
the model as unanticipated shocks.  The discount rate r = 0.04.  The simulation that varies gw 
only (yellow line) holds the experience-earnings profile fixed at its 1980 level in Figure 2A.  The 
simulation that varies gx only (orange line) holds aggregate wage growth fixed at the temporal 









1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Varying both g_x and g_w Varying g_w only
Varying g_x only Trend Nonemployment (data)Figure 10.  Age Structure of Rise in Nonemployment Implied by the Model 
 
A. Model  B. Data 
   
 
Notes:  Model calculations are based on the general model of Section IV.  Observed changes in the experience-earnings profile and 
aggregate wage growth are fed through the model as unanticipated shocks.  The discount rate r = 0.04.  Age 40 is interpreted as 20 
years of working life in the model.  Data are taken from March Current Population Survey microdata for white males aged 16 to 64 
with fewer than 30 years of potential experience, who report that they are neither students nor self employed.  Nonemployment rates 








































































































































Data: Age<=40 Data: Age>40Figure 11. Implied Response of Nonemployment by Education to Observed Changes in Experience-Earnings Profile and Aggregate 
Wage Growth 
 
   
   
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations based on general model of Section IV.  Observed changes in the experience-earnings profile and 
aggregate wage growth are fed through the model as unanticipated shocks.  The discount rate r = 0.04.  When the experience-earnings 
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
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Varying g_x only Varying g_w only









1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
C. 13-15 Years of Education
Varying g_x only Varying g_w only









1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
D. 16+ Years of Education
Varying g_x only Varying g_w only




Notes: Measures of average actual experience against potential experience for pooled years from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Non-dashed straight lines represent least squares 
regressions with the intercept constrained to equal zero. For details on the construction of the 
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